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to sustain a classification where under the defined applicable standard such
a classification should be invalidated.
The preemptory rejection of the state's proffered justification indicates the
actual :test applied was the balancing test utilized in Reed rather than the
more rigid standard defined by the court. The fact that the majority opinion
searches for "apparent justifications" negates the requirement that the
"central" purpose must be justified; any reasonable justification would be
sufficient to uphold a classification if the purpose outweighs the interests of
the challenging party.
The extension of the Reed standard of review to cover nonstereotypical
sex-based classifications is consistent with the attitude of Congress and the
lower courts in prohibiting classifications based on sex. By applying the
balancing standard this decision, like Reed, refused to declare sex a suspect
classification or even to discuss the invidious implications of discriminatory
practices; therefore, the case does not provide a valid basis for adjudication
of similar controversies. Indeed, implicit in the discussion is an evasion of
the stated government purposes, resulting in an indefinite criterion for application of the standard. A more explicit guideline for future analysis would
have resulted if the court had presented the reasoning behind its rejection
of the school's stated objectives.
There still exists the need for a concise and consistent stringent standard
of review. This necessity is underscored by the actions of Congress 'and the
executive in promulgating studies and laws which promote the full realization
of women's rights.
Judith A. Johnson

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Defendants' Rights-An Accused
May "Waive" The Privilege To Testify Through
Disruptive Courtroom Conduct
United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1974).

Louis Ives repeatedly disrupted his criminal trial in United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington by addressing the bench out of
turn, shouting accusations and obscenities, arguing with the judge, and
physically assaulting various officers of the court. Aware of Ives' previous
history of courtroom misconduct,' the trial judge frequently warned 'the de1. United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 1974). In his firsttrial,
which ended in mistrial, Ives made lewd gestures, assaulted his attorneys, and-swore-at
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fendant that he would be removed from the courtroom if he continued to
disrupt the proceedings. In one early conference with prosecution and
defense counsel, the judge stated that Ives would be permitted to testify only
if he did not disrupt the activities of the court." During his trial Ives was
physically removed from the courtroom four times and placed in a special
cell equipped with facilities which allowed him to hear the proceedings
with a telephone so that he could consult with counsel. After Ives was removed for the final time, the trial judge ruled that he would not be allowed
to return to the courtroom. The remainder of the trial, resulting in defendant's conviction, took place in Ives' absence despite his renewed requests
through counsel to testify in an orderly manner.
Ives appealed to the Court of Appeals for ;the Ninth Circuit, principally
contending that he had been deprived of his constitutional and statutory right
to testify in his own behalf in a criminal proceeding. 4 Held-Affirmed. A
defendant's privilege to testify can be waived by his disruptive conduct at
trial. 5 It is within the discretion of the trial judge, after warning the defendant of the consequences of his actions, to determine that the privilege to
testify has been waived."
The privilege of an accused to testify in his own criminal trial developed
from a gradual statutory abrogation of the common law rule disqualifying an
interested party from being his own witness. 7 Reform movements in England
and the United States championed this affirmative privilege as a means of
broadening rather than restricting the channels of truth within the criminal
trial. s By 1884, all states except Georgia had passed statutes establishing
the criminal defendant's privilege to testifyY A statute removing the common law disability in the federal courts was enacted in 1878 and today remains substantially unchanged. 10
the judge and defense counsel during two occasions on the witness stand. He was removed from the courtroom 16 times.
2. Id. at 942-43.
3. Id. at 944-45.

The trial judge, in denying one such request by defendant's

counsel, explained that Ives' past violent conduct made the court unwilling to rely on
his promise to behave properly and thereby jeopardize the safety of those who would

be in the courtroom during his testimony.
4.
5.
6.
7.

WASH.

Id. at 937.
Id. at 941.
Id. at 942.
See Popper, History and Development of the Accused's Right to Testify, 1962
U.L.Q. 454. For a brief but comprehensive summary of the development of.the

accused's privilege to testify, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-82 (1961).

See also 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
at 674-83 (3d ed. 1972).
8. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 575 (1961).
9. For a compilation of this statutory transition, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365
570, 577 (1961).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1970). The American experiment in modem criminal
cedure was not adopted in England until 1898. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570,

78 (1961).
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Although the importance of the privilege to testify has been frequently proclaimed by American courts, 1 the United States Supreme Court has never
given this statutory privilege the standing of a constitutional right. In Ferguson v. Georgia,' 2 the Court was faced with a challenge to a procedural
modification to the Georgia statute which provided that an accused was incompetent to testify at his ,trial, and declined to rule on the underlying constitutionality of the statute.1 3 The majority opinion dealt only with the narrow
procedural section "properly" before the court.' 4 Concurring in the opinion,
Justices Frankfurter and Clark criticized the reluctance of the Court to
adjudicate the constitutionality of these "organically inseparable" sections.' 5
These Justices found no difficulty in dispensing with formalisms of pleading
and reaching "the candid determination that [the incompetency statute] is
unconstitutional."' 6

The doctrine of waiver as it applies to constitutional rights and statutory
privileges has traditionally followed the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst.17 In that case, involving the waiver of
the sixth amendment right to counsel, the Court stated that "a waiver is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege."' 8 One line of American cases, however, has also based waiver
on conduct which is "so inconsistent with the intent to enforce the right in
question as to induce reasonable belief that such right has been relin-

quished."'

9

11. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described the privilege as one of
"inestimable value." Yates v. United States, 227 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1955), af!'d
in part, rev'd in part, 355 U.S. 66 (1957); see United States v. McCord, 420 F.2d 255,
257 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 943 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963); Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C.
1964), a/I'd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
12. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
13. Id. at 572, 596.
14. Id. at 572, 573, 596.
15. Id. at 600.
16. Id. at 601.
17. 304 U.S. 458 (1938); see Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in

the Citadel, 84

HARV.

L.

REV.

1, 8 (1970).

18. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
19. Jeong Soon v. Beckman, 44 Cal. Rptr. 190, 192 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), quoting
Howard J.White, Inc. v. Varian Associates, 2 Cal. Rptr. 871, 875 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960),
quoting Mp'lIco-Dentn1 Bld" Co v.Horton P. Converse, 132 P.2d 457, 469 (Cal. 1942);
see, e.g., McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 872 (1953);
Masac,, v. ,idelers Ihs. Lo., /,r.2d 'Y3, /o (btn Cir. 1931); Frankturt-Barnett Co.
v. William Prym Co., 237 F. 21, 28 (2d Cir. 1916); United Firemen's Ins. Co. v.
Thomas, 82 F. 406, 408-09 (7th Cir. 1897); Wagner v. Kevan, 245 A.2d 881. 884
Conn. Super. Ct. 1968); Kessinger v. Anderson, 196 P.2d 289, 295 (Wash. 1948). These
cases recognize both express waiver and also implied waiver reasonably inferred from
conduct. The pivotal factor in determining either is the intention to relinquish a right.
To eatablish an implied waiver of a legal right, there must first be a clear, unequivocal
and decisive act which evidences such an intention. The stringency by which acts must
infer this intention to constitute a waiver is the interpretative issue which distinguishes
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The only American case prior -to United States v. Ives20 involving the alleged waiver of the privilege to testify was United States v. Bentvena.2z The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that while the conduct of the
accused in this particular situation did not warrant a finding of waiver of the
privilege to testify, it would not absolutely preclude such a finding under different circumstances. 22 Significantly, the court also stated that it felt defendant's early serious misconduct merited a warning that further acts of violence
'23
"might result in a curtailment of the privilege of testifying.
Whether waiver is based on intentional relinquishment or on mere conduct,
the standard for determining waiver of rights or privileges guaranteed by the
Constitution has been consistently described as higher than that for rights or
privileges based solely on statute. 24 The Supreme Court has indicated that
when a defendant's constitutional rights are infringed during trial, the usual
rules requiring a simple showing of harmless error to avoid reversal do not
apply. 25 Instead, to avoid reversal, error must be shown harmless beyond
a -reasonable doubt. 26 A similar conclusion that waiver of constitutional
rights is judged by a stricter standard than waiver of statutory privileges is
reflected in Johnson v. Zerbst.27 The Supreme Court there noted, "It has
been pointed out that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' s28
Although the court in United States v. Ives 29 recognized this distinction,
it essentially avoided the necessity of applying such differences in the treatment of waivers of constitutional and statutory privileges. For purposes of
its opinion the court presumed a constitutional basis for the privilege to -testify
even though it expressed doubt ,that the privilege actually has such a status.30
The court concluded that even if the privilege to testify was impliedly guaranteed by the fifth amendment, the defendant's conduct was -nevertheless
3
sufficiently serious to amount to a waiver of this constitutional privilege. '
most implied waiver cases. No less significant in determining intention to waive is the
requirement that the right waived be a known right.
20. 504 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1974).
21. 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
22. Id. at 944.
23. Id. at 944.
24. This conclusion seems to be a logical extension of the maxim that "[c]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights."
16 AM. JuR. 2d ConstitutionalLaw § 131 (1964).
25. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
26. Id. at 23-24.
27. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
28. Id. at 464, quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937),
Hodges v. Eaton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882), Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
29. 504 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 940.
31. Id. at 940-42.
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The uncertain state of the law regarding the waiver of essential defense
32
privileges was recently confronted by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen.
The trial court in Allen held that a disruptive criminal defendant had waived
the sixth amendment right to -be present in the courtroom.3 3 After Allen's
writ of habeas corpus alleging deprivation of a constitutional right was
denied,3 4 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
a waiver, whether express or implied, denotes a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right.8 5 Thus, a trial court could not set a standard
of conduct from which it could infer a waiver of constitutional rights. The
criminal defendant's right to be present -at all stages of the proceeding was
3
therefore absolute.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, declaring
that under proper conditions a judge could expel -a criminal defendant from
the courtroom for extremely disruptive behavior.3 7 Before a defendant can
lose this right to be present, he must be warned by the judge that he will
be removed if he continues his disruptions. 38 The right, once lost, could be
reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to adhere to standards of courtroom decorum. 39 The Court made no mention of waiver or the need for
voluntariness in its opinion; it characterized a disruptive criminal defendant's
expulsion as the "lost" constitutional right to be present -and found the deprivation of this right to be a permissible judicial -tool -to maintain order.40 Expulsion, a discretionary summary response available to trial judges in handling contemptuous defendants, was justified by the inherent limitations of
other means of dealing with such defendants, including binding and gagging
41
within the courtroom and citing for contempt.
The implications of Allen were not viewed uniformly in subsequent cases
dealing with disruptive defendants. 42 Many cases interpreting Allen have
discussed its meaning in terms of waiver by conduct or implied waiver of the
Tight to -be present. 43 Some have specifically concluded -that obstreperous
32.
33.
(1967).
34.
35.
(1970).
36.
37.
38.
39.

397 U.S. 337 (1970).
People v. Allen, 226 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Il1. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 907
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 339 (1970).
Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 337
Id. at 234-35.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
Id.,at 343, 344.
Id. at 343, 344.

40. Id. at 343, 344.

41. Id. at 343-45.
42. See United States v. Price, 484 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269 (9th
Cir. 1972).

43. See United States v. Price, 484 F.2d 485, 486 (9th Cir. 1973); United States

v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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conduct may be the basis for the implied waiver of other rights. 44 By contrast, at least one judge has cited Allen as analagous 'to the strict Johnson
v Zerbst 45 express waiver standard, holding that a valid waiver of a constitutional right must be an intentional relinquishment of that right. 46 Still
another court has characterized Allen's import as that of a carefully drawn
47
exception to the constitutional right to be present.
Although Allen has been the subject of differing interpretations concerning
its theory of waiver, it has been uniformly interpreted as setting certain
specific requirements for the discretionary exercise of the expulsion power.
The court in United States v. Ives48 apparently ignored some of these requirements, including the need for a prior specific warning to the disruptive defendant of the consequences of his actions and the right to reclaim a lost right
or privilege upon promise to behave properly. Allen did not clarify whether
a loss of the right to be present implies the loss of other attendant statutory
rights and privileges which can be exercised by a defendant only while in
court. While some courts have espoused such a derivative loss view with
regard to the right to represent oneself, 49 no decision before Ives had directly
held that an implied loss of the privilege to testify accompanies the loss of
the right to be present. In Allen the Court studiously avoided the word
"waiver," thus obscuring, but not specifically rejecting, the requirement in
Johnson that an express waiver is necessary in order to deprive a criminal
defendant of a fundamental right. Ives implicitly recognized "waiver by conduct" as a prevailing legal concept.5 0 Thus, Ives has shocking and subtle
effects on the privilege to testify, the waiver of rights, and the judicial management of disruptive defendants.
Compared with Allen, 'the direct impact of Ives can be seen in three major
ways. First, Ives allowed the court to deprive the defendants of the opportunity to reclaim his lost or waived privileges, although Allen required the
court to reinstate the defendant's privileges following his earnest promise to
44. See United States v. Price, 484 F.2d 485, 486 (9th Cir. 1973) (all rights requiring the accused's direct participation at trial); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (the right to represent oneself at trial).
45. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
46. Harvin v. United States, 445 F.2d 675, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
47. Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 274 (9th Cir. 1972). This court held that
Allen had reaffirmed the constitutional magnitude of the right of the accused to be present, and thus did not erode the right in any regard beyond the narrow disruptiveness
exception. Id. at 274. This exception theory avoids all waiver implications, express or
implied, by describing the right to be present as a privilege which simply never arises
in certain carefully designated circumstances. For an incisive discussion of the exception theory as it relates to Allen, see Note, Excluding the Unruly Defendant, 42 U.
COLO. L. REV. 485, 487-89 (1971).
48. 504 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1974).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124, 1125 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
50. United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 1974).
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conform to standards of judicial decorum. 5' Ives also disregarded the requirement of specificity in the court's warning which must precede a loss or
waiver of privileges. Allen had predicated the court's right to exclude the
defendant on the necessity of a prior warning by the judge that defendant
would be removed if he continued his disruptive behavior. 52 Ives, despite
its language that "a defendant must be warned of the consequences of his
actions," demanded much less than the Allen standard would require. 5' The
court in Ives concluded that defendant had waived his privilege to testify
even though he was never warned that these particular consequences might
result from his disruptive acts. 54 While the -trial judge in Ives did inform
defendant's counsel of this possibility, the only warning repeatedly made in
Ives' presence was that he would be removed if he disrupted the proceedings.5 5 Thus, despite its apparent language to the contrary, Ives permitted
,the loss of the specific privilege to 'testify when preceded only by a generalized
warning of removal.
Third, Ives had the subtle effect of further obscuring the ambiguities of
Allen. The two most disturbing features of Allen were the uncertainties it
created over the meaning of "waiver" and the lack of clear standards for the
expulsion power. Allen failed to discuss the subject of waiver, and this
omission has resulted in confusion concerning the paradigm of voluntary, understanding, and irrevocable waiver. 56 Ives exacerbated this problem by
couching the loss of the testimonial privilege in 'terms of an irrevocable "waiver by conduct."' 57 By failing to adequately distinguish Ives from Johnson and
Allen, the Ninth Circuit perpetuated the prevailing confusion over the meaning of the term "waiver." Instead, Ives serves to further expand the concept of waiver from its traditional limitation as the knowing and intentional
relinquishment of a right, to the broader standard of implied relinquishment
through voluntary disruptive action.
Although Allen set some procedural limits for the use of the expulsion
power, 58 it provided no standards for the exercise of the judge's discretion
in this matter beyond condemning "speech and conduct which is so noisy,
disorderly, and disruptive that it is exceedingly difficult or wholly impossible
to carry on the trial." 9 Ives added hittle to the search for more precise stand51. Id. at 941,942.
52. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
53. United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 943-44.
55. Id. at 943-44.
56. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
57. United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 1974).
58. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). These procedural limitations include the defendant's right to reclaim the lost right on a bona fide promise to behave
properly and the requirement that the defendant be specifically warned as to the consequences of his actions. Id. at 343.
59. Id. at 338.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 6 [2022], No. 4, Art. 11

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.

6

ards except for encouraging judicial consideration of "the probability of continued disruption and violence." 60 The 'addition of this language, which may
itself be implicit in the use of discretion prescribed in Allen, merely broadened the scope of conduct available to a judge in making his critical decision
which will affect the privilege of the accused to defend himself against a criminal charge.
Appearing in the wake of the Supreme Court's historic delineation of expulsion power in Allen, Ives might at first seem to represent the reasonable
efforts of one court to resolve existing ambiguity by implementing the spirit
of developing case law. in applying Allen's principles to a different privilege
and to an extreme instance of calculated disruption by a criminal defendant,
however, the Ninth Circuit disregarded two procedural safeguards to discretionary expulsion explicitly required by the Supreme Court--a warning of
the specific consequences of a defendant's' disruptive actions and a right to
reclaim the lost right upon a good faith promise to behave properly. 6 1 By
characterizing the "lost right" standard of Allen in terms of "waiver by conduct," Ives needlessly obscured and weakened the concept of waiver as "the
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."6 2
Without adequate warning, even conduct directed at thwarting she judicial
process cannot reasonably be regarded as an intentional relinquishment of
a known right.6 s
The cumulative effect of Ives could be to broaden greatly the discretion
of judges in denying a defendant's rights in the trial process through the expuIlsion power. While the underlying logic of Allen in protecting courtroom
sanctity :at
the expense of the right to be present is sound, the extension of
this logic to permit the involuntary and irrevocable loss of defense privileges
violates principles of fairness which are implicit within the judicial process.
Rather than inviting 'abuse of discretion 'and the inequitable denial of essential rights, the courts should protect the "palladiums of liberty"6 4 only by
fundamentally fair procedures, including specific warning, a right to reclaim
upon -bona fide promise to behave 'properly, and clearly defined guidelines
for use of 'the expulsion power.
Stuart F. Lewis
60.
61.
62.
63.
REV. 1,

United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 1974).
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346 (1970).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L.
10, 11 (1970).

64. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346 (1970).
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